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ABSTRACT 
 
I apply the multiple streams lens, which was originally developed to explain 
agenda-setting in national systems, to the EU policy formation (agenda-setting and 
decision-making) process. Choice is the result of coupling by policy entrepreneurs of 
three relatively independent streams—problems, politics, and policies. Each stream is 
conceptualized as having a life and dynamics of its own. At fortuitous moments in time, 
skilled policy entrepreneurs will attempt to couple the streams together by “selling” their 
pet package of problem and policy to a receptive political audience. The chances that a 
particular policy will be adopted increase when all three streams are coupled together. I 
conclude with implications for the debate of the role of institutions, actors, and ideas in 
EU policy-making and a clarification of two paradoxes of EU policy. The first paradox 
stresses the centrality of political power in the absence of institutional hierarchies. The 
second paradox highlights but also circumscribes the role of epistemic communities in 
the EU. 
 The process of making policy at the European Union (EU) level is often 
characterized as fluid, complex, and incomprehensible. It contains all the properties of 
what Weick (2001) has called a loosely coupled system, whose main characteristic is a 
high degree of ambiguity. Participants often don’t have clearly formulated goals; they 
drift in and out of decisions, while the whole process is so complex that it is poorly 
understood by most. For this reason, scholars have repeatedly suggested that multiple 
streams is a good way to analyze EU policies. The lens, inspired by Cohen et al’s (1972) 
garbage can model and Kingdon’s (1995) reformulation of it, assumes ambiguity is an 
integral part of the policy making process. Peters (1994), Olsen (2001), and Andersen and 
Eliassen (2001, 11) conceptualize the complexity and heterogeneity in the EU as 
producing what Richardson (2001) has termed as “an emerging garbage can.” The 
loosely coupled processes they observe produce ambiguity and lead to significant 
variability in outcomes. Richardson (2001, 22, 13) claims that “EU policy…often seems 
like Kingdon’s ‘primeval soup’ [because it] fits well with what we already know about 
some aspects of the EU.” However, despite praising the lens’ potential, few attempts have 
been made to-date to adapt such a model of domestic policy choice to the EU level. 
  
In this paper I apply multiple streams to EU policy, using examples to illustrate 
my points and to derive hypotheses; no attempt is made to test the hypotheses. Multiple 
streams has been hailed as one of “the more promising” and widely used theoretical 
frameworks of the national policy process (Sabatier 2007, 7), but despite its asserted 
potential, it has not been applied to the EU (but see Corbett 2005). I do so, taking the lens 
beyond agenda-setting to the entire EU process of policy formation (agenda-setting and 
decision-making). I narrow the locus of inquiry exclusively to the EU level without 
examining the impact such decisions may have on member state policies. The argument 
differs from prevailing conceptions of multilevel governance. Such theorizing argues that 
the European level is a collection of international, national, and sub-national levels all of 
which must be viewed as constituting a whole (Hooghe and Marks 2001).Under these 
conditions, the study of public policy cannot clearly distinguish between national, sub-
national, and European policies (Zahariadis 2002). I draw the distinction to focus on what 
may be termed as the horizontal dimension of the EU, i.e., the collective institutional 
level, instead of its vertical dimension, i.e., the EU-member state level.
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I briefly review approaches to EU policy-making. Then I introduce multiple 
streams by highlighting what is meant by a loosely coupled system; I argue the EU fits 
the description well. The section is followed by a detailed examination of the various 
elements and processes of the multiple streams lens and their implications for EU policy. 
I conclude with implications for the debate of the role of institutions, actors, and ideas in 
EU policy-making and a clarification of two features of EU policy. The first stresses the 
centrality of political power in the absence of institutional hierarchies. The second 
highlights but also circumscribes the role of epistemic communities in the EU. 
 
Perspectives on European Policy-Making 
 
Conventional wisdom claims that no one theory can explain the entire EU policy 
process; rather multiple theories may be appropriate at different levels or stages of 
  2analysis. This is good advice when policy analysis is at its infancy, but the study of EU 
policy has reached a point of maturation when a second step is feasible: to begin 
developing better theories of the EU policy process that transcend levels or stages of 
analysis and still explain a good portion of the variance in policy outcomes. Such work 
has already been done at the national level (Sabatier 2007), but not at the EU level. 
Perhaps the reason is because the EU has for a long time been viewed as sui generis. As a 
result, analysts have sought to develop unique concepts and theories to fit the 
peculiarities of the EU arena. However, although some institutional features are unique, 
there is no reason to suppose that the activities of the participants in the EU policy 
process “have different purposes simply because the institutional arena is different from 
the other in which they may be involved. The politics of the EU are just that—normal 
politics, with whatever one thinks are the normal features of domestic politics, and by 
extension policy-making—in European countries” (Wallace et al 2005, 10). I begin with 
this premise and adapt a lens of domestic policy-making to the EU level.  
 
Current theorizing is incomplete as analysts narrow down the study of the EU 
policy process to different levels (Peterson 1995), stages (Richardson 2001), or issues 
(Majone 1996). Peterson (1995) presents a decision-making framework where decisions 
are divided into three levels or types. The first is the supersystemic level which involves 
largely constitutional issues and looks at history-making decisions, such as the Single 
European Act. The second level involves policy-setting decisions at the systemic level. 
Finally, there are policy-shaping decisions which are made at the sub-systemic level. 
Intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism is “best” at the first level, new 
institutionalism in the second, and policy network analysis in the third.  
 
Richardson (2001) advocates the familiar stage heuristic as a good way of 
dividing labor and utilizing concepts already well developed in national accounts of 
policy-making. Combining stages with theoretical tools, Richardson proposes an eclectic 
approach to theory development where different tools are considered useful at different 
stages of the policy process. For example, he maintains that epistemic communities (Haas 
1992) are a good tool to provide insight at the agenda stage whereas Sabatier and 
Weible’s (2007) analysis of advocacy coalitions may prove more useful at the decision 
making stage.  
 
Majone (1996) stresses the characteristics of issues as the driving force in 
explaining the types of politics and policy-making that will emerge. He views integration 
as better suiting European level institutions when it involves regulatory issues. This is 
because it is a low-cost method of policy-making in the context of a resource-constrained 
EU. There are also powerful incentives for the Commission to supply regulation 
stemming from the founding treaties and the demand by business due to the perceived 
cost efficiencies of dealing with only one institution, contingent upon the discretion 
conferred by national governments (Pollack 2003). This stands in stark contrast to social 
policy, which involves largely redistributive politics and zero-sum gains.  
 
The problem with these perspectives is they are eclectic with little or any 
guidance as to why one model may be more appropriate or better than the others. Each 
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narrow confines of applicability to either stages or levels. Moreover, the split of the 
process to stages or levels leaves both approaches vulnerable to the same criticisms 
leveled at similar debates at the domestic level. There can be a potentially endless paring 
down of the process, leading to fragmentation and gaps in knowledge cumulation 
(Sabatier 1991). The issue perspective is less eclectic, but it assumes rationality and 
coherence even in areas where it may not be present. For example, even if one were to 
assume that the Commission acts as a monolith, issues are not always thrust upon the 
agenda as a result of discretionary power. The policy-making process is not linear where 
solutions always aim to solve problems on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. We need 
models that don’t negate the value of these arguments but have the capacity to go beyond 
them. 
 
The EU as a loosely coupled system 
 
The EU may be accurately described as a loosely coupled system. As Weick 
(2001, 384) puts it, “to talk about a loosely coupled system is not to talk about structural 
looseness, but about process looseness.” Such systems focus on the links and autonomy 
among constituent parts. A loosely coupled system maintains high internal differentiation 
among units, low system integration, and a high capacity via mechanisms of autonomy 
and coherence “to combine the contradictory elements of connection and autonomy” 
(Orton and Weick 1990, 216). A central element of a loosely coupled system is a high 
degree of ambiguity. Loose couplings produce indeterminacy in that systemic events 
unfold unpredictably, unevenly, sporadically, and discontinuously (Weick 2001, 384). 
Such indeterminacy highlights disconnections between information and decision 
activities leading to ambiguity in terms of problematic preferences, unclear technology, 
and fluid participation (Cohen et al 1972). The EU approximates this description well 
(Peters 1994; Richardson 2001). It can be conceptualized as a fragmented polity but not a 
state (Hix 2005). Yet it does perform essential functions. Funds, for example, are 
distributed to various regions in the Union despite the number and high institutional 
differentiation among the directorates general (DG’s) of the Commission and the often 
problematic preferences of the actors involved in the process (Heinelt et al 2003).  
 
Ambiguity means three things in the policy process. First, participants often have 
unclear goals. As Zahariadis (2003a, 3) puts it, “quite often time constraints force 
politicians to make decisions without having formulated precise preferences. Decisions 
are made and may be facilitated by opaqueness.” For example, Sharkansky (2002, 69-70) 
maintains that vagueness of objectives is a good way of coping with complex and 
conflicting political demands. Citizens have a limited understanding of the EU and quite 
often they don’t know what to expect or what to demand of it. Similarly, many policy 
makers and other officials involved in EU decisions have limited or no goals. For 
example, during the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s, few national government 
officials, with the possible exceptions of the Germans and Greeks, actually had a strong 
opinion about what to do.  
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government officials is high and participants drift from one decision arena to the next—
with the possible exception of COREPER members. Bureaucrats at the Commission are 
instrumental in drafting legislation, but their ability to participate and influence the 
outcome at later stages of the decision decreases dramatically. The European Parliament 
has limited powers as a conditional agenda-setter (Tsebelis 1994), and the ability of its 
members to adopt EU legislation differs dramatically across time and issues. Moreover, 
transnational groups and NGO’s exercise a strong influence on whether, when, and what 
form some decisions will take. As a result, the same participants don’t necessarily track 
the same issue throughout the decision stages. 
 
Third, organizational technology is opaque. While specific participants make be 
aware of their individual responsibilities and place within the EU policy process, they 
often exhibit rudimentary knowledge of the whole process. Jurisdictional boundaries are 
blurred, particularly in areas such as trade or foreign policy where the Council, the 
Commission, and the Parliament share responsibilities. The end result is turf battles and 
interagency conflict, making the process highly unstable. Add to this a plethora of 
different decision rules—such as co-decision, consultation, and the like—and the process 
becomes highly incomprehensible to most. As Kingdon (1995) aptly puts it in reference 
to the US government, the left hand does not know what the right is doing. 
 
Under such conditions, rational models of policy making are of limited utility. 
There can be no goal-intending or interest-pursuing behavior if goals have not been 
clearly formulated prior to the decision. Distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant 
information is problematic. Policies cannot address problems because problem definitions 
are vague and constantly shifting (Zahariadis 2007, 67). Multiple streams, which is a lens 
of policy-making stressing temporal order and political manipulation, is a better choice. 
 
Who pays attention to what and when is critical in understanding what decisions 
are made and why. Ekengren (2002, 85) perceptively informs that “European governance 
erodes the idea of a singular national timetable.” A source of ambiguity, therefore, stems 
from the temporal structure of European governance. Because national governments (or 
other actors) cannot singularly control the European agenda, the numbers of forums and 
working groups coupled with the simultaneous meetings that need to be attended to 
address European issues have rendered national government preferences to a state of 
constant formation.   
 
Political manipulation provides the logic of analysis (Zahariadis 2003a). Under 
tight deadlines and problematic preferences, knowledge of issues and process provide the 
keys to unlock the puzzle of choice. Manipulation refers to the bending of ideas and 
institutions by policy entrepreneurs—individuals with access, resources, time, and 
energy—who try to get their pet proposals adopted. Knowledge of the process is 
important because entrepreneurs must behave strategically to activate attention to their 
pet issues and proposals. Substantive knowledge of the issues is also important because 
entrepreneurs must also “sell” their package of problem and solution to a receptive 
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different elements of the policy process.  
 
Not all policies may be accurately explained by the multiple streams lens. Some 
EU decisions are made in a more rational, goal-intending fashion. For example, getting 
the British refund was the result of rational strategies and the determination by the British 
government to use EU rules to achieve its objectives. Multiple streams is most suitable in 
those EU “decision situations” where ambiguity appears to accurately describe the 
situation (Richardson 2001, 13).  
 
Elements of multiple streams 
 
Multiple streams argues that EU policies are the result of coupling by policy 
entrepreneurs of three relatively independent streams—problems, politics, and policies—
during politically opportune moments. Each stream is conceptualized as having a life and 
dynamics of its own. At fortuitous moments in time, labeled policy windows, skilled 
individuals or corporate actors, called policy entrepreneurs, attempt to couple the streams 
together by “selling” their pet package of problem and policy to a receptive political 
audience. The chances that a particular policy will be adopted increase when all three 
streams are coupled together. The argument is represented schematically in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The problem stream 
 
The problem stream consists of various conditions that policy makers and citizens 
want addressed. Examples are government budget deficits, environmental disasters, 
inflation, rising medical costs, and so on. Policy makers find out about these conditions 
by way of indicators, focusing events, and feedback. Indicators may be used to assess the 
existence, magnitude of a condition, and the scope of change - for example, the cost of a 
program, infant mortality rates, or highway deaths. Indicators can be monitored either 
routinely or through special studies. For example, special studies occasionally seek to 
estimate the impact of subsidies on European agricultural production and prices. The 
indicators then can be used “politically” to measure the magnitude of change in the hope 
of catching official attention (Stone 2002). Calls to reform the Common Agricultural 
Policy have been routinely bolstered by such findings. Of course, not all conditions 
become problems. As Kingdon (1995, 110) categorically asserts, problems contain a 
“perceptual, interpretive element.” Some conditions come to be defined as problems and 
consequently receive more attention than others (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). How is this 
done? A range of values is normally associated with a particular issue. Changes in 
specific conditions may violate those values and therefore activate interest and attention. 
People define conditions as problems by letting their values and beliefs guide their 
decisions, by placing subjects under one category rather than another, by comparing 
current to past performance, and by comparing conditions in different countries.  
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involve comparing conditions among countries within the Union or between it and other 
countries. For example, comparing the price of automobiles across member states can be 
used to justify (or oppose) harmonization of tax rates across member states. The problem 
is that consumer in different countries pay different taxes, creating considerable variance 
in final price. EU total factor productivity, as a whole, has also been compared to that of 
the United States, Japan, and other countries in order to deficiencies (if any) and call 
attention to potential tax breaks or other remedies. In the latter case, national variations 
within the EU are less important as are cross-national ones between the EU and others. 
 
Focusing events also draw attention to problematic conditions (Birkland 2004). 
Conditions and focusing events direct attention to specific evaluative dimensions of 
particular problems; attention is fixed by the media or policy entrepreneurs (Jones, 1994). 
There are two types of focusing events that may become EU problems: international and 
national. On an international level focusing events, such as the events of 9/11 in the US, 
have led to significant changes in security policy throughout the EU regarding terrorism 
and related activities. Closer to home, military operations in Kosovo in early 1999 
brought to limelight the unmistakable lack of EU power to enforce its decisions. In 
similar fashion, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 made abundantly clear 
the EU’s energy vulnerability due to its heavy reliance on a single source, Russia. On a 
national level, focusing events may draw an EU response. For example, the attempt to 
pass through British security explosives in liquid form has led to an EU-wide policy of 
banning such substances from being taken on airplanes, with specific exceptions. 
Whether man-made and to an extent predictable, such as budget deficits or wars, or 
natural and unpredictable, such as the bird flu or the BSE crises, problems focus attention 
on issues and propel them high on the agenda. 
 
Feedback from previous programs is important in that it helps highlight what 
works and what doesn’t. Of special note is the European Court of Justice’s rulings, which 
have occasionally provided the impetus for integration in new areas. For example, some 
rulings, as in the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon cases, had significant implications for a 
variety of areas, whereas others, such as the Philip Morris case, proved catalytic in the 
specific area of Europe-wide mergers (Wincott 2001). Programmatic feedback also 
provides information back into the system that catalyzes changes not only in the direction 
of policy but also in the structure of the EU policy-making system itself (Richardson 
2000). The story of European integration is that of path dependence (Pierson 1996). Past 
decisions and institutions affect present decisions and limit future courses of action. How 
is that done? In this case, one needs to differentiate between negative and positive 
feedback. Negative feedback raises the possibility of corrective action. For example, the 
problem of creating the single European market made it very clear that cross-national 
mergers and acquisitions could not be monitored simply by national competition 
authorities (Cini and McGowan 1998). Positive feedback, on the other hand, prompts a 
favorable rather than a corrective response. The positive results of the program open the 
possibility of policy moving further in the same direction (Pierson 2000). Put differently, 
positive feedback occurs when a change causes further changes to be amplified (Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005). For example, the “creeping competence” of the Commission is 
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Commission but also to the success of its previous regulatory functions (Pollack 2003; 
Majone 1996). Regulation begets regulation; as the Commission acquires more 
competence and skill in one area, it also acquires legitimacy. It can, therefore, claim 
competence in “neighboring” areas, not currently under its jurisdiction, simply on the 
basis of previous success and legitimacy. The whole conflict over subsidiarity may be 
explained less by a rational rule of efficiency and effectiveness and more by positive or 
negative feedback transmitted throughout the system via loose couplings (Zahariadis 
2003b).  
 
Successfully implementing a solution in one area may spill over to another 
facilitating the adoption of the same solution in a seemingly unrelated area. The concept 
is akin to the neo-functionalist concept of integration spillover. Success in one area 
makes it easier to place—or legitimizes the placement of—the same issue on the agenda 
in another area. The liberalization of telecommunications and the resultant benefits have 
paved the way to argue for similar changes in energy policy. 
 
Attention is to an extent a function of what else preoccupies the minds of policy 
makers. Problems, caused either by more demands or reduced problem-solving capacity, 
tend to appear intractable when more of them crowd the agenda. Problem load, that is, the 
number of difficult problems occupying the attention of policy makers, has a significant 
negative effect on the efficient utilization of information and a nonlinear negative effect 
on problem activation (Zahariadis 2003a, chapter 6). More difficult problems require 
significant and expensive information gathering and processing efforts. Quite naturally 
when policy makers are faced with many difficult problems, they are likely to spend 
more time and resources processing information that may be irrelevant. Efficiency of 
information utilization decreases while the time spent on producing and disseminating 
information grows longer. Problem load has a non-linear impact on problem activation—
the number of problems remaining active but not addressed on the agenda. Light loads 
are associated with more activation. When there are mostly easy problems to solve, 
problem activation and by consequence decision conflict are up. This is because easy 
problems crowd the agenda leading to a loss of urgency and the need to prioritize. 
Competition for attention stiffens without any increase in the capacity to address the 
problems. As a result, political conflict increases dramatically. Medium loads lessen 
activation, but heavier loads increase it dramatically. More difficult problems lead to 
more discussion but less action. Increased levels of frustration are the likely outcome. As 
the number of problems addressed by the EU continues to climb, the end result is more 
political conflict and less efficiency.  
 
Under these conditions, attention shifts quite rapidly, abruptly, and unpredictably 
from one problem to the other or one dimension of the problem to another. Couplings 
between the various parts of the process are further loosened, enhancing ambiguity 
(Weick 2001, 44-8). Conditions are ripe for political manipulation by those with expertise 
and intimate knowledge of the process of policy-making.  
 
The politics stream 
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Three factors are important in the national politics stream: administrative or 
legislative turnover, pressure-group campaigns, and the national mood (Kingdon 1995). 
Of the three factors, the combination of the national mood and turnover in government 
exerts the most powerful effect on choice. However, a cross-national examination has 
concluded that the first two factors may be combined in light of the dominance of 
political parties in European national politics (Zahariadis 1995). After all, decisions are 
made by partisan policy makers.  
 
EU politics differs from either analytical picture because the legislative body of 
the Parliament is not the supreme lawmaker and institutional rules of decision-making are 
fluid and shifting. Besides, public mobilization plays a lesser role in EU decisions 
(Princen 2007). In light of these differences, three factors are hypothesized as being 
relevant in the politics stream: the balance of Council member national and partisan 
affiliation, the ideological balance of parties in Parliament, and the European mood. Of 
the three factors, the Council has the most influence; but the combination of Council 
member ideology and the European mood exerts the greatest impact on policy choice. 
Because members of Parliament are elected along national lines and the institution is 
involved in an advisory capacity in many instances—unlike the Council—its effects are 
likely to be less than those of the Council. 
 
It’s no secret; parties matter in domestic policy-making. Scores of studies have 
found empirical evidence, supporting the argument that different parties pursue different 
policies to satisfy the ideology or perceived needs of their voters (e.g., Garrett 1998). 
When elected ministers attend the Council, they don’t drop their partisan “hat,” they 
simply add to it. They also represent their national interest, however vaguely that may be 
formulated. Politics in the Council is therefore a bit more complicated than in domestic 
policy-making. Using the ideological complexion of Ministers in some aggregative 
fashion will not suffice as a guide to successfully predicting what policies may be 
adopted. National interests also make a difference. The influx of new faces in the Council 
may alter the dynamics of agreement in the politics stream. It may propel some issues to 
the top of the agenda and drown out others. It may also facilitate agreement in some 
options but not others. For example, an influx of mostly Social Democrats in European 
capitals will alter the dynamics of support for expanded labor protections at the EU level. 
At the same time, the absence of strong Conservatives from the table, e.g., the United 
Kingdom in 1997, lessened opposition to the Social Charter. But ideology is not enough; 
national proclivities also make a difference. For example, the pro-integration instincts of 
the German Christian Democrats contrast sharply with the anti-integration stance of the 
British Conservatives. Though not as prominent as it used to be, the Left-Right divide 
continues to provide a useful tool for exploring the dynamics of the politics stream, 
coupled with a careful examination of national representation. 
 
Similar dynamics may be observed in the European Parliament although the 
national element is less prominent. Because members are elected, organized, and seated 
on the basis of partisan affiliation, ideological complexion is a very important guide to 
accurately predicting what kind of policies will animate members and what language 
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Parliament will almost certainly bring attention to labor and welfare issues and create an 
institutional majority that is more likely to support policies that enhance worker rights or 
establish minimal welfare protection across the EU. Though less prominent, the national 
dimension is not absent. In issues of supreme national importance, e.g., the possibility of 
Turkish membership, members of different parties still coalesce largely along national 
lines, e.g. Greeks or Cypriots, to protect “the national interest.”  
 
Although the concept is hard to pin down, the mood refers to the “climate of the 
times,” the idea that important policy makers, opinion leaders, and other politicos think 
along similar lines (Kingdon 1995, 148). In domestic politics, the government senses the 
national mood, which swings from time to time, and seeks to capitalize from it by 
adopting policies that coincide with it. In this sense, mood plays an important role in not 
only constraining public policy by showing what the limits of the possible are, but it also 
shapes policy by pointing toward some policies and away from others.  
 
European public opinion has traditionally played a lesser role in EU policy-
making, implying that the mood is less important. The reasons for the weakness of the 
European relative to the national mood reside in the national politics of each member 
state and the absence of a European education system. European elections are still 
contested along national lines and issues (Franklin 2001). Although the concept of the 
national interest is amorphous and changing, it still exists in the imagination of national 
politicians and publics. A distinct equivalent concept has yet to be formulated at the EU 
level. Moreover, national policy makers frequently utilize higher order symbols to reach 
out and mobilize the entire nation in support of certain solutions (Elder and Cobb 1983).
2 
The absence of a European education system that will imbue a common identity replete 
with symbols and ideology of commonality to disparate national citizens tempers the 
effect of the European mood. 
 
Nevertheless, there exists a European climate of the times that has an impact. The 
story of European integration is replete with periods of “eurosclerosis” and “europhoria.” 
For example, the late 1970s and early 1980s may be characterized as a period of 
“eurosclerosis” that included pessimism among elites, interest groups, and the public at 
large about European integration. In contrast, the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
generally a period of great optimism and enthusiasm about the prospect of greater 
integration. Ideas such as the single European market or the Maastricht Treaty would 
probably have encountered strong opposition if they were brought up in the 1970s. The 
mood provides a guide to policy makers as to the general limits of public acceptance. 
Ideas coinciding with the mood gain greater legitimacy and “currency.” Those going 
against the flow, such as a Europe-wide pension system, face an uphill battle to gain 
acceptance. 
 
The policy stream 
  
Whether a solution, idea, or policy—I use the terms interchangeably—is ripe for 
adoption depends on its availability in the policy stream. That’s a function of two 
  10elements: the dynamics of competition among ideas and the structure of policy networks 
where the ideas germinate.  
 
The policy stream consists of a “primeval soup” of ideas advocated by specialists 
in policy networks. The specialists are individuals who share a common concern in 
narrowly defined policy sectors, such as telecommunications or competition, and define 
problems and propose solutions to those problems. They may include Commission 
officials, parliamentary staffers, national Ministry experts, academics, industrialists, 
unionists, consumer advocates, and others. Ideas compete for consideration and adoption 
in such fora as Commission papers, consultation rounds, parliamentary hearings, 
academic journals, and others. While the number of ideas floating in the soup is very 
large, few ever receive serious consideration by many participants in the network. Due to 
processing limitations, the number of ideas must be narrowed down significantly. 
 
Some ideas survive the period of consideration largely in tact, while others are 
combined into new proposals or just disappear. Whether an idea bubbles to the top of the 
stream, i.e., becomes ripe for consideration and adoption, depends on two factors: value 
acceptability and technical feasibility. Value acceptability refers to the degree of 
agreement among major participants in the policy stream and does not span the entire 
spectrum of all EU policy makers. An idea that has the support of many participants in 
the narrow policy stream stands a greater chance of being adopted than one that doesn’t. 
Of course there is no “majority” rule; but it stands to reason that ideas which are opposed 
by many in the stream will find it difficult to survive for long periods of time. The policy 
stream represents a transnational (EU) sub-systemic level of analysis closely paralleling 
those in domestic policy-making. Members of national policy networks may also be 
involved in EU policy networks (Kriesi, Adam, and Jochum 2006).  
 
How is agreement achieved? There is no one way to do this; agreement may be 
attained on the basis of participation, efficiency, power, inclusiveness, or justice. For 
example, the absence of participation in a key hearing or consultation round with the 
Commission robs an idea from its key advocate at a propitious moment in the process. 
Many ideas in EU education policy owe their duration of survival to the presence or 
absence of such powerful specialists (Corbett 2005). Issues such as streamlining and 
shortening the review process of mergers at the Commission have gained support among 
business firms on the basis of efficiency (Cini and McGowan 1998). Quite often the 
predispositions of key participants bias the rate of survival. The fact that many if not most 
officials in the Competition DG had until recently a background in law ensured that ideas 
emphasizing legal sensitivities were looked upon more favorably or with less scrutiny 
than ideas based strictly on economic concepts (Cini 2002). At other times, the 
Commission or Parliament seeks input from previously less involved groups to oppose 
certain ideas or legitimize others. For example, the Commission’s role in fostering a 
dialogue between the social partners at the European level legitimized the potential 
influence of organized labor in the EU despite direct opposition by member states, 
including the United Kingdom, and national actors, such as the Confederation of British 
Industries (Cram 1997, 40-56). The main point is there are many routes to the top without 
any one of them being more frequently used or more important than the others. 
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Technical feasibility refers to ease of implementation. Does the idea appear to be 
implementable with minimal problems? If so, the ideas chances of survival in the policy 
stream greatly improve. The notion of positive and negative integration (Scharpf 1996) 
captures to an extent the essence of the concept. Negative integration refers to the 
dismantling of national obstacles to the creation of the single market. Positive integration 
refers to the creation of new rules or institutions to create the single market. Negative 
integration is much easier to implement because dismantling tariffs, for example, can 
become effective with the stroke of a pen. Staffing and empowering a European agency 
responsible for managing Europe-wide pensions is far more difficult to establish. 
 
A special (but not the only) problem of EU implementation is the issue of cost 
(Zahariadis forthcoming). In times of budgetary constraints, ideas that appear to be 
particularly costly if implemented stand a lesser chance of receiving serious 
consideration. For example, labor regulations that demand the creation and staffing of 
new agencies at the EU and/or national levels are less likely to survive because most 
member states will bulk at the cost of implementing them. 
 
The other element affecting an idea’s availability in the policy stream is the 
structural integration of policy networks. The term denotes a group of individuals who 
share a basis of knowledge and interest about certain policies, e.g., labor policy. But 
emphasis is on relations among actors, not on the actors themselves (Adam and Kriesi 
2007). The term should be distinguished from the stability of linkages between actors 
found in policy communities, the shared beliefs found in tightly-knit advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007), and the ad hoc boundaries of issue networks (Richardson 
2001). Ideas are debated in policy networks, but their emergence does not always follow 
what Kingdon (1995) has termed as a long period of softening up. The concept refers to 
the process by which solutions establish their viability in the policy stream. Its tempo—
temporal movement from glacial to rapid—and mode—substantive content from 
marginal change to completely new—differ dramatically across issues and networks. 
Combining the two dimensions yields a matrix with four possibilities (Durant and Diehl 
1989). Zahariadis and Allen (1995) elaborate on this process, linking it to network 
integration (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Based on structural characteristics, networks may be classified as more or less 
integrated. More integrated networks are smaller in size, have a consensual mode, higher 
administrative capacity, and more restricted access. Conversely, less integrated networks 
are larger in size, have a competitive mode, lower administrative capacity, and less 
restricted access. Less integrated networks are more likely to facilitate a quantum to 
gradualist evolution and more integrated networks are more likely to follow an emergent 
to convergent pattern. 
 
Less integration makes contact among participants more chaotic and adversarial, 
leading to innovative ideas swiftly entering the stream. The tempo, however, is likely to 
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into “new” solutions. Higher numbers of participants increase the likelihood that more 
new ideas will enter the stream. Exchange in networks based on competition is 
characterized by infrequent and chaotic contacts between participants and the logic of 
adversarialism. Under such conditions, ideas are likely to enter the policy stream quite 
abruptly without regard for continuity with pre-existing policies. Conversely, networks in 
which participants are consensus-seekers have more frequent and more formalized overt 
or covert contacts where bargaining prevails. Because such logic of exchange stresses 
common interests and a search for unanimity and in order to make such meetings more 
than just trial-balloon arenas, ideas tend to be worked out internally within participants, 
such as unions, before they are aired in public. Once some of the details are ironed out, 
the formal presentation in public is likely to increase the idea’s appeal. Moreover, intense 
bargaining with other participants means that amendments to accommodate others are 
likely. In these situations, we would expect slow entry into the stream and a fairly long 
softening process which will occasionally be punctuated by rapid propulsion into 
salience. The evolutionary pattern would flow from emergent to convergent.   
 
While the selection criteria for idea survival mirror those of domestic policy-
making, the structure of EU policy networks does not. The point reinforces the argument 
made earlier that institutions may be different but the activities of participants remain 
largely the same. Ideas survive in the policy stream following basically the same pattern 
as they do in domestic policy-making: they are debated, stretched, eliminated, and 
advocated on the basis of efficiency, equity, or power. Moreover, their likely ease of 
implementation increases their chances of viability. However, these processes take place 
in different institutional environments. The biggest differences in structure include the 
number of participants and degree of access to the network. EU policy networks tend to 
contain much larger numbers of participants. Part of the reason stems from the fact that 
there are more stakeholders involved in the EU than the national level (Richardson 2001). 
For one, there are now at least twenty-seven national agencies with scores of interest 
groups, bureaucracies, and other actors. In light of the importance of EU decisions for 
national policies, each feels the need to be involved and have a say in the final outcome.
3 
Moreover, while some groups may be represented collectively at the EU level, e.g., 
business through UNICE, individual firms also feel the need to maintain separate 
representation to add more weight to their own individual interests. EU networks are also 
unique in that the Commission plays an important “hub” role. Few such structures 
typically exist at the national level. One of the most important functions of the 
Commission is that of information producer and disseminator, driven partly by the need 
for legitimacy and bargaining advantage (Nugent 2001).  
 
Both differences coupled with the consensus-seeking mode that characterizes 
some EU politics create interesting policy dynamics. On the one hand, as the number of 
participants expands, structural integration decreases. On the other hand, a consensus-
seeking mode, carefully pieced together and nurtured by the Commission, leads to more 
integration. These two changes pose challenges for the trajectories of ideas in policy 
networks. While the substantive germination process, i.e., mode, may remain the same as 
the possibility of new ideas or recombinations remains similar in both EU and national 
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already plays a major role, such as trade or competition policies, may consistently exhibit 
a shorter period of softening up. While continued consensus-seeking tends to prolong 
debate and careful delineation of issues, the increasing number of participants implies a 
swifter trajectory. As participants continue to multiply exponentially, and assuming no 
erection of institutional barriers to access, the consensus-seeking days of the Commission 
may be numbered. Increasing complexity produces decentralizing tendencies (Zahariadis 
2003b), potentially robbing the Commission of its gatekeeping function. In light of these 
trends, ideas are likely to follow a trajectory along the quantum-convergent axis in areas 
where the Commission still maintains influence. In other areas, such as foreign policy, 
the process of softening up will be longer along the more familiar emergent-gradualist 
axis. In the latter cases, different actors or coalitions will try to block or ignore new ideas 
that do not conform to prevailing values. Such patterns of mutual adjustment elongate the 
softening up process.   
 
Policy windows 
  
Policy windows are politically opportune moments in time. They open in either 
the problem or the politics stream, and they are either predictable or unpredictable. 
Moreover, while they frequently open on their own, they are sometimes opened by 
specific individuals.  
  
Policy windows are fleeting “opportunit[ies] for advocates of proposals to push 
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon 1995, 165). 
They represent the catalysts, not the reasons, which help circumscribe the context for 
action. In other words, they provide the stimulus for choice, but they do not determine the 
outcome. As Pierre and Peters (2005, 74) maintain, “decisions cannot be made if all the 
requisite elements do not come together in time.” But agendas may be altered by the 
presence of open windows. Policy windows signify the temporal component of the 
policy-making process by infusing a sense of urgency; they signal to policy entrepreneurs 
the temporal limits of the coupling process.  
  
The literature is replete with the importance of such “opportunity structures,” but 
there is no attempt to link them to other variables in the policy process. For example, 
Héritier (2003) highlights the importance of opportunities and the role they play in 
enhancing or inhibiting policy effectiveness. Similarly, Cram (1997, 40) highlights the 
importance of negotiations over the Single European Act as providing the “window of 
opportunity which the Commission required to launch a renewed offensive on the social 
dimension.” Ekengren (2002, 59-60) maintains that in EU policy-making timing is 
crucial; it anticipates and forestalls actions by other participants. Acting at a politically 
opportune time, “the national stance is given better conditions to affect the outcome: ‘the 
sooner the idea is known by others, the easier it is to rally support behind it and to build 
coalitions with like-minded partners.’” The political advantage is to anticipate and 
forestall, not just to be first. Nevertheless, Ekengren does not fully analyze the 
implications of his concept to the EU policy-making process. 
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leak of nuclear material in Chernobyl opened a problem window while the resignation of 
the Santer Commission opened a political window. Windows alter the dynamics of 
agenda-setting when the influx of new policy makers points to important problems that 
need to be addressed or when the emergence of new problems animates policy makers to 
do something about them. While problems are scarce and ephemeral, they bias choice by 
fixing attention on certain issues and by structuring the search for available solutions in 
predictable ways (Zahariadis 2007). One of the defining characteristics of multiple 
streams is that the temporal dimension of choice alters the problem-solution sequence. 
Most studies of policy-making adopt a rational view of the process where problems are 
first identified and solutions are then developed to address those problems. In contrast, 
multiple streams contends that windows structure the process, leading frequently to the 
paradoxical outcome of solutions chasing problems. As Kingdon (1995, 205-6) 
categorically asserts, “advocacy of solutions often precedes the highlighting of problems 
to which they are attached.” Zahariadis (2003a) more fully specifies the impact of 
windows on the problem-solution sequence. 
  Windows opening in the politics stream foster a doctrinal (solution-problem) 
sequence. There are four reasons why this is likely to be the case (Zahariadis 2003a, 73). 
First, it is easier to scan for solutions than for problems. While there is potentially an 
endless list of serious policy problems, there are only a limited number of solutions. The 
reasons are significant limitations in time and resources needed to develop solutions. 
Pointing to solutions first, satisfies policy makers politically because it gives them the 
aura of control over what issues may be raised and how they may be defined. Second, an 
electoral victory is perceived by the incoming members of Parliament or the Council as 
approval for enacting (or opposing) promised policies. Third, rapid technological change 
frequently leads to the discovery of previously unnoticed problems. Fourth, success of an 
instrument or idea in one policy area legitimizes its adoption in another. Social policy or 
education policy is replete with the Commission’s attempts to take advantage or open 
policy windows to promote policies whose details had already been worked over (Cram 
1997; Corbett 2005). 
 
  Windows opening in the problem stream encourage a consequential (problem-
solution) sequence. This is the typical picture of public policy. The emergence of a 
problem, such as the bird flu, pointed attention to glaring deficiencies in health systems 
across the EU and prompted search for specific solutions and policy coordination. The 
negative repercussions of climate change led to EU attempts in 1992 to introduce a 
common CO2/energy tax that would curb gas emissions (Andersen 2001, 117). 
 
  Timing and context have recently been given considerable prominence in studies 
of policy choice (Zahariadis 2003a; Richardson 2001; Andersen and Elliassen 2001; 
Ekengren 2002; Pierre and Peters 2005). A pivotal concern is that utility-maximizing 
models of choice inject a sense of purposive action that is not present in many cases of 
policy-making (Stone 2002). Policy windows provide a good way to understand the 
frequent limitations of rationality and to specify the conditions for deviations from linear, 
rational conceptions of the policy process. 
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Policy entrepreneurs are individuals or corporate actors who try to couple or join 
the streams together. They are more than just advocates of policy ideas; they are power 
brokers who manipulate problematic preferences and unclear technology and exploit the 
system’s fluid participation rates to push forth their pet solutions. They more than just 
support or advocate innovative solutions (Mintrom 2000); they also actively oppose rival 
ideas. From an individual’s point of view, they behave opportunistically (Christopoulos 
2006), but from a system’s point of view, they create meaning for policy makers with 
problematic preferences. Manipulation encompasses both views clarifying March’s 
(1997, 23) argument: “decision making may, in many ways, be better conceived as a 
meaning than as an action factory.”  
 
Any actor or participant to the policy process may conceivably act as an 
entrepreneur. It’s not a state of being but of doing. How does one become an effective 
entrepreneur? 
 
The most important property of effectiveness is persistence. Policy entrepreneurs 
spend time researching, advocating, and waiting for the right moment (Kingdon 1995). 
Because they need to present their ideas to a political audience at times over which they 
have little control, they need to spend time softening up the policy stream and mobilizing 
support when needed. A keen sense of timing is essential. But there is more to it than 
that. Knowing what happens in other areas is equally important. Developing a good 
understanding of how their narrow concern fits within developments elsewhere helps 
entrepreneurs refine their proposals and arguments (Mintrom 2000, 141). In other words, 
coalitions and networks need to also be built and nurtured outside the policy stream in 
order to facilitate coupling. While preparing the ground for coupling is a constant part of 
entrepreneurial life, activating coalitions outside the policy stream takes place during 
open policy windows. 
 
Effectiveness is also enhanced by two more elements. Access is essential. 
Entrepreneurs who have access to the centers of power are more likely to be successful 
than others. Access is a function of two dimensions: position and presence (March and 
Romelaer 1976). Position is tied to relational attributes (Christopoulos 2006). For 
example, position within a hierarchy gives some individuals access to policy makers to 
“make their case.” In their institutional capacity Commission officials frequently serve 
this function well. They not only have the mandate to formulate proposals, but they also 
serve as gatekeepers of information in EU policy networks (Nugent 2001). But position 
alone does not ensure effectiveness. Policy entrepreneurs gain access through presence. 
One has to be present at the right meetings and venues to forcefully make the case. The 
configuration of informal networks and the nature of the process further amplify the 
opportunities for presence increasing the chances of success. For example, 
Commissioners P. Sutherland and M. Marin were able to navigate interminable meetings, 
while M. Richonnier and H. Jones, high-level officials in the Education DG, successfully 
built coalitions with Parliament and  the Council to help pass the Erasmus proposal in 
1987 (Corbett 2005).  
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Resources are a key property of effectiveness. Policy entrepreneurs devote or 
create resources to soften up the policy stream and couple the three streams together at 
opportune times. Apart from time, entrepreneurs devote money to produce and 
disseminate information to sway important constituencies. All interest groups and their 
lobbyists in Brussels engage in this activity to a varying degree of success (Greenwood 
2003). At times, entrepreneurs may create organizational capacity at some point in time 
so that it may serve as the facilitator for more positive feedback in the future. H. Jones, 
the director of education training and youth in the 1970s and 1980s, was instrumental in 
moving the directorate to the DG of social affairs. He did so because he considered its 
activities heavily constrained by the ineffectiveness of the institutional structure of the 
time and because he believed that social affairs would provide more opportunities to 
further his activities (Corbett 2005, 108-9).  
 
Choice is facilitated by agents of policy change. Entrepreneurs not only fix 
attention to particular problems and solutions, but they also direct the search process, 
actively support their own or oppose rival solutions, and skillfully use time, access, and 
resources to couple the streams together. As (Pierre and Peters 2005, 59-60) categorically 
assert, “individual entrepreneurs become the crucial means of producing action. The 
centrality of individuals is not only a result of personal power and political skills, it may 
also be a function of the uncertainty of the situation and the desire of participants to be 
able to associate proposals for resolving the issue with individuals who advocate them.” 
Although no one person controls the process, entrepreneurs have the power to manipulate 
ideas and institutions and bias choice toward certain outcomes. The advantage 
entrepreneurs have in the process does not stem from advantages conferred upon by 
institutional design. In fact, the EU is notorious for its fluid and adolescent institutional 
environment. Formal rules regulate access and protect, to an extent, the rights of 
minorities in the decision-making process (Pierre and Peters 2005, 61). In the absence of 
institutional constraints or a central authority, entrepreneurs are free to use their skills 
effectively to pursue their own objectives. In the presence of loose couplings with few 
rules and generous ambiguity, entrepreneurs can short-circuit the process. Paradoxically, 
political power in the form of entrepreneurial dominance is likely to play a bigger role in 
the more open and accessible EU policy process relative to more institutionalized and 
closed domestic policy processes. 
 
The Dynamics of Coupling 
 
Each part of the process has been discussed in isolation from the others. It is now 
time to analyze the process by which all parts are coupled together into a single 
“package.” The process is labeled coupling, and it consists of joining together the streams 
during open policy windows. I first discuss the various strategies of manipulation that 
policy entrepreneurs use to couple the streams together, and then I probe the implications 
of different modes of EU policy-making on the dynamics of coupling. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs use various strategies of manipulation to couple the streams 
together thereby manipulating the actual selection process. They don’t decide on policies, 
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Entrepreneurs must recognize and exploit opportunities. It’s not enough for policy 
windows to open in the politics or problem streams. Entrepreneurs must perceive them as 
opportunities. Skillful entrepreneurs are not only innovative and socially perceptive; they 
must maintain substantial contacts with external networks so that they may build 
coalitions at the time of coupling. Perceptiveness necessitates knowledge and skills. One 
has to first become knowledgeable of the technical dimensions of the issue. Then one 
must be skilled at adapting this knowledge to different environments. As Mintrom (2000, 
271) puts it, “with social perceptiveness, policy entrepreneurs can develop 
understandings of the ways that other people look upon social conditions and, from there, 
begin to establish how others are likely to react to given proposals for policy change.” 
The point is that the coupling process privileges those with technical expertise and 
knowledge of the whole process. Policy entrepreneurs must be able to recognize an 
opportunity by connecting their knowledge of the issue with the proclivities of policy 
makers at opportune times. 
 
While most analysts of multiple streams specify windows as opening 
independently of entrepreneurs, some analysts (Cram 1997; Corbett 2005) claim that 
entrepreneurs must also be adept at forcing some windows to open or open windows for 
others to exploit. Again most examples are drawn from officials within the Commission 
although others in Parliament or the Council can play the same role. In light of rapid 
technological advances in the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission encouraged 
liberalization and deregulation at the national level. In this way, Commissioner E. 
Davignon (Industry) and Director-General M. Carpentier (Telecommunications, 
Information Industry, and Innovation), under the capable leadership of J. Delors, were 
able to create a policy vacuum in EU information and communication technology policy. 
The vacuum opened a policy window, which the Commission later was only happy to 
exploit (Cram 1997, 88). O. Guichard, France’s education minister in 1969-1972, 
proposed to The Hague Summit in 1969 the creation of an EC Council of ministers of 
education to foster political cooperation. His motive was to address some of the national 
problems caused by the student revolt of 1969 but also to open up the window for 
Parliament in collaboration with the Commission to propose their own institutional 
innovations in the field of higher education (Corbett 2005, 55-6). 
 
Coupling the three streams is more likely when entrepreneurs frame issues 
appropriately. Coupling involves more than persuading policy makers to adopt a 
particular proposal. It involves activating particular dimensions of the problem to fit the 
solution in language that appeals to different policy makers (Mintrom 2000, 137). 
Information is not value-neutral. Entrepreneurs build frames that convey particular 
meaning to different audiences, building coalitions and containing conflict (Schön and 
Rhein 1994). Such frames must speak not only to ideological proclivities of ministers in 
the Council but their national perspectives as well. 
 
Analysts have identified two theories that illuminate the use of policy frames: 
prospect theory and affect priming. Cognitive changes in how situations are described or 
framed have predictable effects on what choices policy makers make. A fundamental 
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to win (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Using this insight and applying it to national 
policy-making, Zahariadis (2003a, 88) argues that if solutions espoused by entrepreneurs 
are large deviations from the status quo, successful coupling is more likely when 
problems are represented as losses; if options represent smaller deviations or a 
preservation of the status quo, coupling success is more likely when problems are framed 
as gains. Because losses are valued more than gains, risky options (or large deviations 
from the status quo), are more likely to be adopted if they are linked to problems, which 
are represented as losses. They require a greater tolerance for risk-taking behavior. Affect 
priming claims emotion influences behavior via mood congruence. Happy individuals 
look for cues and interpret their world in ways that highly agree with their mood. 
Emotion fixes attention and biases search for alternatives while cognition shapes frame 
interpretation and bias the selection process (Zahariadis 2005).  
 
Effective entrepreneurs often use salami tactics to couple the streams. Policy-
making involves a series of decisions which are interconnected. A salami tactic is the 
strategic manipulation of sequential decision-making (Maoz 1990). Entrepreneurs are 
assumed to have a grand design of the desired outcome. However, because they are 
reasonably certain their desired solution will not be adopted because it’s too risky, they 
cut the process into distinct stages, which are presented sequentially to policy makers. 
Doing so promotes agreement in steps. By the time policy makers become aware they are 
being manipulated, they have invested too much to depart from the course of action. They 
end up accepting an outcome in steps they would have rejected as a whole. There are 
three reasons for this paradoxical outcome: path dependence, sunk costs, and the 
endowment effect. Prior decisions preclude certain options and favor others (Pierson 
1996). Resources already invested in the process or an outcome bias toward continuing it. 
The endowment effect refers to overvaluation of current possessions. If the proposed 
policy deviates substantially from the status quo and is therefore less likely to be adopted 
by risk-averse policy makers, entrepreneurs will cut the process into discrete and 
seemingly unrelated stages. Manipulating policy images as positive or negative ensures 
agreement in several steps. Once the desired outcome becomes obvious to those being 
manipulated, path dependency and sunk costs bias decisions toward continuing the same 
policy even though the final outcome would not have been accepted on its merits had it 
been presented and voted upon at the outset. 
 
Does variation in policy-making modes affect the dynamics of coupling? Wallace 
(2005), for example, identifies five different ways that policy is made: the Community, 
regulatory, distributional, policy coordination, and intensive transgovernmentalist modes. 
Differences may be aptly summarized along a continuum containing two dimensions: 
issue characteristics and institutional involvement and structure. For example, 
transgovernmentalism involves many different member states but few other EU 
institutions. On the other hand, the Community method involves most EU institutions.  
 
Looking at the question from an issue perspective, the answer is probably no. 
Different issue characteristics don’t affect the nature of coupling (Zahariadis 2003a). 
While distributional properties may make agreement among actors substantively more 
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entrepreneurs still need to use the same strategies to sway policy makers in their favor 
during open policy windows. Where change may be observed is in duration. 
Distributional issues take a longer time to soften up in the policy stream due to a wide 
range of opinions regarding equity and social justice and the larger number of actors 
involved.  
 
Looking at it from an institutional perspective, the answer is yes. Once ideas 
become entrenched, they become institutionalized. This fact further insulates them from 
negative feedback, leading to more change along the lines indicated through positive 
feedback. This possibility is most likely in autonomous hierarchies. The reason is two-
fold. First, by definition it is easier in hierarchies to transmit information and enforce 
policy change from top to bottom than the reverse. Assuming encasement of ideas in 
institutions, it is logical to expect more choice to favor and reinforce the prevailing 
orthodoxy (True et al 2007). Second, autonomy preserves the capability of institutions to 
contain or resist cascading changes dictated by the broader system, filtering away those 
deemed unfavorable to local elites. 
  
In light of the mostly informal and opaque EU policy process, what Benz (2003, 
100) labels “de-institutionalization of decision-making,” coupling becomes generally far 
more difficult to accomplish at the EU level than the national level. The EU has many 
access points (Peters 1994). Institutional channels of communication vary across issues, 
while the impact of particular institutions is informal, fluid, and uncertain. For example, 
much formal policy-making in national settings takes place within well established 
institutions of government or the parliament. In contrast, the Parliament exercises 
considerable agenda-setting and decision-making influence sometimes in some areas but 
not in others. Similarly, the Commission has significant agenda-setting and intermediary 
power in many areas but not in others. What emerges is a picture of an institutionally 
autonomous but not hierarchical environment.  
 
The end result is likely to lead to predictable patterns of policies. On the one 
hand, in coupling situations of autonomy and hierarchy, i.e., where participation is 
restricted but autonomy is encouraged—e.g., consultation procedure, EU regulations, and 
the like—choice will be biased in favor of positive rather than negative feedback. Policy 
entrepreneurs will encounter fewer problems implementing solutions favoring positive 
amplification of deviations from the status quo for the reasons mentioned above. On the 
other hand, in coupling situations of autonomy but no hierarchy, i.e., those that involve 
many participants and more-or-less equal institutions, choice is likely to favor the status 
quo or small deviations from it. The argument goes beyond familiar notions of 
incrementalism in public policy (Hayes 2006). From a system’s point of view, 
institutional autonomy fosters small deviations whether positive or negative while the 
absence of a hierarchy prevents significant doses of positive feedback. 
 
The process of coupling may also be elongated depending on the policy-making 
mode. As the number and iterations of actor interaction increases, there is more political 
conflict and less agreement. Because policy windows are ephemeral, the longer it takes 
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to oppose change. Consequently, solutions proposing policy change under co-decision are 
less likely to pass than under consultation. The paradoxical implication is that although 
the co-decision procedure was adopted to enhance the power of Parliament, the Council 
can maintain its superior power by having adopted rules biased against changing the 
status quo. 
 
Entrepreneurs are well advised to engage in strategic venue-shopping. Successful 
coupling involves the exploitation of institutional biases. This is true not only in agenda-
setting (Princen 2007), but fundamentally in decision-making. Given the wide range of 
decision-making rules in the EU, the number of actors and the consequent degree of 
needed agreement vary dramatically (Moser, Schneider, and Kirchgässner 2000). For 
example, the number of actors (and iterations) involved in the co-decision procedure 
differs dramatically from that of consultation. Despite some Treaty guidance as to what 
issue needs to be discussed under what procedure, there is considerable ambiguity and 
hence room for manipulation.  
 
Entrepreneurs may use EU-level institutions where they anticipate a more 
sympathetic hearing. Interest groups regularly engage in this type of behavior 
(Richardson 2000). Because issues that fall under EU purvey are normally considered to 
be cross-national, successful entrepreneurs may frame their arguments in ways that 
highlight cross-national dimensions. In an increasingly globalized world and a 
constitutionally anchored single European market, “bringing out” the cross-national 
dimensions of issues, previously thought of as purely domestic, should not be very 
difficult as U.S. federal and civil rights leaders discovered in the 1950s and 1960s.
4 The 
process entails not simply pushing the item high on an EU institution’s agenda, but also 
activating some dimensions over others. The manipulation of frames does not just serve 
as a convenient device to forge agreement, but also as an institutional device to 
manipulate the number of decision makers. In this case, coupling success crucially 
depends on whether the solution deviates from the status quo (and how much) and what 
decision rules are followed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the context of loose couplings, I have argued that multiple streams can 
illuminate the EU policy process and explain outcomes. Peters (1994, 20) argues that 
multiple streams accurately describes the EU’s agenda-setting process, but “the questions 
of policy formulation may be resolved in the manner assumed by more conventional 
models.” I have taken his argument one step further, applying the lens to the entire 
process of EU policy formation. 
 
Why do EU policy makers adopt some policies but not others? Persistent policy 
entrepreneurs are in search of important problems to which they may attach their pet 
solutions. During open policy windows they attempt to “sell” their problem-solution 
package to receptive EU decision makers. The chances that a particular option will be 
adopted increase when all three streams are coupled, depending on the type of open 
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attention and bias choice.  
 
This picture of policy-making differs radically from other approaches. It uncovers 
rather than assumes rationality, and it meaningfully synthesizes several incomplete 
models in a coherent whole. By assuming independence of streams and by specifying the 
conditions under which the evocation of problems may follow rather than precede that of 
solutions, multiple streams reveals the limits of rationality. The point is not that policies 
cannot or are not made in ways assumed by rational models. Rather policies frequently 
do not follow the linear problem-solution sequence. The key is to specify when that may 
be the case. Moreover, policy is not always made on the basis of interests and efficiency, 
as typically assumed by transaction-cost analysts. From the system’s point of view, the 
most important act of policy entrepreneurs is to provide meaning and identity to policy 
makers with problematic preferences. 
  
The approach also provides a framework to pull together various models in a 
theoretically meaningful way. It utilizes some elements of policy network theorizing and 
insight generated by institutional venue-shopping. Each model is an incomplete guide to 
policy choice by itself (Richardson 2000; Princen 2007). But combined with the logic of 
manipulation and timing embedded in multiple streams, they provide a more complete 
explanation of the EU policy process. 
 
  Multiple streams stresses the importance of individuals and ideas in policy 
formation. Policy entrepreneurs broker deals, helping to couple solutions and problems to 
a receptive political audience. They are clearly an important piece of the puzzle. Ideas are 
also important, existing independently of specific actors. Commissioners come and go, 
participants move in and out of the process, but ideas in the policy stream still bubble to 
the top. Ideas are constantly accepted, rejected, or amended by various participants in the 
policy stream, in the latter’s quest to forge coalitions and enhance the likelihood that their 
solution will eventually be adopted. Apart from aiming to solve a particular problem, this 
process also adds political meaning to policy choice by making it easier for policy makers 
to distinguish between potential friends and foes. Ideas cannot be differentiated from the 
interests that promote them although they may be differentiated from any one individual 
who advocates them. 
  
This perspective complements traditional debates which link ideas to institutions 
(e.g., Garrett and Weingast 1993). Those arguments connect ideas, which are 
conceptualized more in the sense of paradigms than solutions, to a process of 
institutionalization. In contrast, multiple streams promotes linkages to the policy process. 
True, institutions play an important role, but the crucial element missing from traditional 
debates is the role of actors. Institutions make things possible, but people make things 
happen. Ideas are loosely coupled to individuals in the sense that they exist independently 
of any one actor although knowledgeable specialists and skilled entrepreneurs are still 
needed to push ideas forward. The point is that the study of the EU policy process needs 
to specify the trajectory of ideas in the narrow policy stream and then explore their 
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the broader policy system. 
 
Of course, this is not the whole story. Institutions and politics also play a role. The 
point is not that institutions are not important or are somehow underspecified in multiple 
streams (Schlager 2007). Multiple streams can be an especially useful lens in cases of 
what Benz (2003, 100) and Pierre and Peters (2005) label “deinstitutionalized” politics. 
While one may quibble with their claim that governance is becoming increasingly 
deinstitutionalized, there is little disagreement as to the adolescence of EU institutions 
and their informality of contacts and power. Institutions enable the coupling of streams 
by some entrepreneurs and discouraging others. They constrain as much as they guide the 
actions and strategies of entrepreneurs (March and Olsen 1989).  
 
Multiple streams sheds light on two important features of EU policy-making. The 
first feature points to the vital role of political power in the absence of institutional 
hierarchies. Although the lens differs from traditional models of political power, it still 
points to its centrality in disorganized, non-hierarchical, loosely coupled systems. Fearful 
of delegating too much power to EU institutions, member states have opted for a more 
open-ended, institutionally less crystallized design. Doing so has unwittingly increased 
the power of EU actors. Power in this case derives not from institutional design but from 
the ability to dominate the process. In the presence of time constraints and problematic 
preferences, a relatively small group of policy entrepreneurs with skills, time, and 
resources are capable of dominating the process and steering decisions toward their 
favorite outcomes. Fluid participation ensures discontinuity in discourse across venues 
while opaque technology confers an advantage to the select few who know the “rules of 
the game.” The more loosely coupled EU policy becomes because of increases in 
problems or member states, the more powerful policy entrepreneurs are likely to be. 
 
The second feature points to the importance and limits of knowledge as power. 
Multiple streams stresses the contingent importance of knowledge in the policy process 
(Radaelli 1995). It highlights the trajectory of ideas in the policy stream and stresses the 
strategic manipulation of ideas and institutions in coupling the three streams. Traditional 
arguments regarding the role of epistemic communities accord significant power to 
experts in scientific communities who can shape the agenda and forge agreement on 
proposed solutions (Haas 1992; Zito 1999). Multiple streams reinforces these findings by 
according special emphasis on the role of policy entrepreneurs. They are experts on the 
substantive aspects of the issue at hand. Knowledge is indeed power, but power is more 
than just knowledge. Entrepreneurs are also risk-takers who know or understand the rules 
of the game. They can dominate the process not simply because they understand the issue 
and its technical aspects. As shown above, that’s necessary but hardly sufficient. 
Knowledge is important but knowing what to do with it and being able to relate it to 
different constituencies in order to build coalitions are key elements of success. This is 
why Commission officials tend to be the more important policy entrepreneurs in EU 
politics. Their grasp of details at the EU level, their networks of information production 
and diffusion, and intimate understanding of the policy process confer upon them 
  23significant advantages over other individuals. Policy dominance in the form of power 
goes beyond expertise and technocracy (Radaelli 1999).  
 
No one controls the EU policy process. Policy entrepreneurs bias choice, but they 
alone do not determine the outcome. Member states and the Parliament still play a crucial 
role in formulating policies. Institutional characteristics still structure the nature of the 
debate. Nevertheless, problems occur without anyone’s prodding. Policy windows 
frequently open in the problem or politics stream irrespective of solutions. In this 
environment, serendipity flourishes; there must still be a confluence of three relatively 
independent streams at politically opportune moments. Multiple streams drives home the 
point that serendipity and politics are indispensable parts of the same EU policy process. 
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Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework
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Trajectory of Ideas in the Policy Stream
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  30Notes 
                                                 
1 For an examination of the vertical dimension of integration and policy-making, see Zahariadis (2003b). 
2 For an example of the dramatic impact of the national mood and conceptions of nationhood in opposition 
to certain policy options, see Zahariadis (2005). 
3 The entire literature on Europeanization deals with the impact of Europe on national policies and vice 
versa. For good recent discussions, see Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) and Graziano and Vink (2007). 
4 Many of the landmark cases of the U.S. Supreme Court were actually based on reinterpreting the limits of 
federal purview (interstate commerce) rather than on any substantive merits of civil rights per se. 
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